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Abstract: We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract
game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions ui :
∏n
j=1Xj → R has a Nash
equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the ex-
istence and the characterization of efficient Nash equilibria mainly follows
from the analysis carried out in part I. When the payoff functions are indi-
vidually quasi-Leontief functions the matter is somewhat more complicated.
We assume that all the strategy spaces are compact topological semilattices,
and under appropriate continuity conditions on the payoff functions, we show
that there exists an efficient Nash equilibria using the Eilenberg-Montgomery
Fixed Point Theorem for acyclic valued upper semicontinuous maps defined
on an absolute retract and some non trivial properties of topological semi-
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1 Introduction
Given a family of sets and functions Si ⊂ Xi and ui :
∏
j∈[n]Xj → Λ, a
Nash points of the abstract game G =
(
ui, Si, Xi
)
i∈[n]
is an element x⋆ of the
product space such
∏
j∈[n] Sj that, for all j ∈ [n], x
⋆
j ∈ argmax(uj[x
⋆
−j ];Sj);
Nash
(
G
)
denotes the possibly empty set of Nash Points of the abstract
game G =
(
ui, Si, Xi
)
i∈[n]
. In this section we investigate the existence of Nash
points in the context of quasi-Leontief functions. If all the payoff functions
ui are individually (respectively globally) quasi-Leontief functions we will
say that G is an individually (respectively globally) quasi-Leontief game. A
quasi-Leontief game is a game which is indifferently either individually or
globally quasi-Leontief. Of course, anything that is true of all individually
quasi-Leontief games is also true of globally quasi-Leontief games. We will
write G =
(
ui, Xi
)
i∈[n]
for an abstract game for which, for all i ∈ [n], Si = Xi.
If each Si has a largest element z¯i then the problem of the existence of
Nash points is trivial and z¯ is a Nash Point.
We will say that x⋆ = (x⋆1, · · · , x
⋆
n) is an efficient Nash point for player
i if it is a Nash point and x⋆i ∈ E(ui[x
⋆
−i]|Si;Si) and that x
⋆ is an efficient
Nash point if it is efficient for all the players.
In section 2 the strategy spaces are partially ordered spaces, or inf-
semilattices, and the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief on the prod-
uct of the strategy spaces; all the results follow from the previous analysis
of quasi-Leontief functions on partially ordered spaces. Assuming that the
constraint sets Si are comprehensive and bounded above subsets of infsemi-
lattices Xi, on can characterize efficient Nash points.
In section 3 the payoff functions are individually quasi-Leontief and the
structure of the strategy spaces is much more restricted, but more classical;
the strategy spaces are compact toplogical spaces endowed with an infsemi-
lattice structure for which the inf operation is continuous, as is the case, for
example, for compact sub inf-semilattices of Rn. Also, the payoff functions
are real valued and continuous. The existence of Nash points in this context
does not follow from any of the previously established results and requires
some topological machinery. We prove the existence of efficient Nash points
using the Eilenberg-Montgomery Theorem and some non trivial facts on the
topology of inf-semilattices.
2 Globally quasi-Leontief games
Finding a Nash point for a globally quasi-Leontief game with n players can
be reduced to n independent maximization problems. This is content of
Proposition 2.0.1 below which settles the problem of the existence of Nash
points for globally quasi-Leontief games under the hypothesis that for all
2
j ∈ [n] argmax(ui;
∏
j∈[n] Sj) 6= ∅. Let S =
∏
j∈[n] Sj and for all i ∈ [n] let
argmax(ui;S)i be the projection of argmax(ui;S) on Si.
Proposition 2.0.1 For all globally quasi-Leontief games G =
(
ui, Si, Xi
)
i∈[n]
we have ∏
i∈[n]
argmax(ui;S)i ⊂ Nash
(
G
)
.
Proof: If one the sets argmax(ui;S) is empty there is nothing to prove. For
all i ∈ [n] pick an element z[i] of argmax(ui;S) and let x
⋆
i = z
[i]
i . We will show
that x⋆ is a Nash point. For for all xi ∈ Si we have ui(z
[i]) > ui(x
⋆
−i; xi), that
is ui[z
[i]
−i](z
[i]
i ) > ui[x
⋆
−i](xi); and trivially we have ui[x
⋆
−i](xi) > ui[x
⋆
−i](xi).
From the remarks following Proposition 3.1.2 of Part I, we have
ui[z
[i]
−i]
♯
(
ui[x
⋆
−i](xi)
)
= ui[x
⋆
−i]
♯
(
ui[x
⋆
−i](xi)
)
= u♯i,i
(
ui[x
⋆
−i](xi)
)
(2.1)
where u♯i,i is the i-th coordinate of u
♯
i. Again, from ui[z
[i]
−i](z
[i]
i ) > ui[x
⋆
−i](xi)
we have
z
[i]
i > ui[z
[i]
−i]
♯
(
ui[x
⋆
−i](xi)
)
. (2.2)
From (2.1) and (2.2) we get z
[i]
i > ui[x
⋆
−i]
♯
(
ui[x
⋆
−i](xi)
)
or ui[x
⋆
−i](z
[i]
i ) >
ui[x
⋆
−i](xi) that is ui(x
⋆) > ui(x
⋆
−i; xi). ✷
The next results shows that, under appropriate but by now familiar con-
ditions, a globally quasi-Leontief game has a Nash point which is also a
maximal element of the strategy space.
Proposition 2.0.2 Let G =
(
ui, Si, Xi
)
i∈[n]
be a globally quasi-Leontief game
such that, for all i ∈ [n], Si is a non empty comprehensive (CUC) subset of
Xi with an upper bound x¯i ∈ Xi. Then
Max
( ∏
i∈[n]
Si
)
∩ Nash
(
G
)
6= ∅.
Proof: The set S =
∏
i∈[n] is clearly non empty, comprehensive and
bounded above; one easily shows that it is also (CUC) since a projection
of a chain in the product space is a chain. By Theorem 2.4.3 of Part I,
Max(S) ∩ argmax(ui;S) 6= ∅, for all i ∈ [n]; in the proof of Proposition
2.0.1 we take z[i] in Max(S)∩argmax(ui;S). Let us see that x
⋆ ∈ Max(S).
Let x ∈ S such that x > x⋆; from xi > z
[i]
i we have (z
[i]
−i; xi) > z
[i] and from
(z
[i]
−i; xi) ∈ S we obtain (z
[i]
−i; xi) = z
[i] and consequently xi = z
[i]
i , and since i
was arbitrary, x = x⋆. ✷
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2.1 Efficient Nash points of globally quasi-Leontief games.
In this section, each Xi is an inf-semilattice and each Si is a nonempty
comprehensive subset of Xi with an upper bound x¯i ∈ Xi. By Proposition
2.3.5 of Part I, there are quasi-Leontief functions ui,j : Si → Λ, i, j ∈ [n]
such that, for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n] Si, ui(x) = minj∈[n] ui,j(xj). For all i ∈ [n] let
u˜i(x−i) = minj 6=i ui,j(xj); it is a globally quasi-Leontief function defined on∏
j 6=iXj. We have ui(x1, · · · , xn) = min{ui,i(xi), u˜i(x−i)}.
A point x⋆ = (x⋆1, · · · , x
⋆
n) is a Nash point if and only if, for all i ∈ [n], the
following condition holds:
(Ni) ∀xi ∈ Xi ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > min{ui,i(xi), u˜i(x
⋆
−i)}.
If x⋆i ∈ argmax(ui,i;Si) then (Ni) holds. If x
⋆ is a Nash point such that
x⋆i 6∈ argmax(ui,i;Si) then there exists xi ∈ Xi such that ui,i(xi) > ui,i(x
⋆
i )
and threfore, by (Ni), ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i); and this inequality obviously imply
(Ni).
If the inequality ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i) does not hold then (Ni) implies that
x⋆i ∈ argmax(ui,i;Si).
If x⋆i ∈ argmax(ui,i;Si) then u
◦
i,i(x
⋆
i ) ∈ argmax(ui,i;Si), since Si is compre-
hensive.
If ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > minj 6=i{ui,j(x
⋆
j )} then, from ui,i(x
⋆
i ) = ui,i
(
u◦i,i(x
⋆
i )
)
,
x⋆j > u
◦
j,j(x
⋆
j) and the fact that ui,j is isotone we have
ui,i
(
u◦i,i(x
⋆
i )
)
> minj 6=i{ui,j(x
⋆
j )} > minj 6=i
{
ui,j
(
u◦j,j(x
⋆
j )
)}
.
Proposition 2.1.1 If, for all i ∈ [n], Si is a comprehensive subset of the
inf-semilattice Xi and if, for all i ∈ [n], ui(x1, · · · , xn) = mini∈[n] ui,j(xj),
where ui,j : Xj → Λ is a quasi-Leontief function, then a point x
⋆ ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi
is a Nash point if and only if, for all i ∈ [n],
x⋆i ∈ argmax(ui,i;Si) (2.3)
or
ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i) (2.4)
Furthermore, if (x⋆1, · · · , x
⋆
n) is a Nash point then so is (u
◦
1,1(x
⋆
1), · · · , u
◦
n,n(x
⋆
n))
and, for all i ∈ [n], ui((x
⋆
1, · · · , x
⋆
n) > ui(u
◦
1,1(x
⋆
1), · · · , u
◦
n,n(x
⋆
n)).
The meaning of Proposition 2.1.1 is that the search of a Nash point for a
globally quasi-Leontief game on comprehensive and bounded strategy spaces
Si can always be reduced to n independent and decoupled maximization
problems – x⋆i ∈ argmax(ui,i;Si) – and that one can choose x
⋆
i ∈ E(ui,i;Si).
Recall that x⋆ is an efficient Nash point for player i if x⋆i ∈ E(ui[x
⋆
−i]|Si, Si)
that is, if
[
xi ∈ Si and ui[x
⋆
−i](xi) > ui(x
⋆)
]
implies xi > x
⋆
i , which is
equivalent to
[
xi ∈ Si and ui,i(xi) > min{ui,i(x
⋆
i ), u˜i(x
⋆
−i)}
]
implies xi > x
⋆
i (2.5)
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(a1) If u˜i(x
⋆
−i) > ui,i(x
⋆
i ) then (2.5) becomes:
[
xi ∈ Si and ui,i(xi) > ui,i(x
⋆
i )]
implies xi > x
⋆
i .
If x⋆i 6∈ E(ui,i;Si) then u
◦
i,i(x
⋆
i ) ∈ Si and u
◦
i,i(x
⋆
i ) 6∈↑ (x
⋆
i ), since u
◦
i,i(x
⋆
i ) 6= x
⋆
i ,
and ui,i
(
u◦i,i(x
⋆
i )
)
= ui,i(x
⋆
i ) = min{ui,i(x
⋆
i ), u˜i(x
⋆
−i)} and therefore (2.5) does
not hold.
If x⋆i ∈ E(ui,i;Si) then (2.5) holds.
A Nash point x⋆ such that u˜i(x
⋆
−i) > ui,i(x
⋆
i ) is efficient for player i if and
only if x⋆i ∈ E(ui,i;Si). We also have ui(x
⋆) = ui,i(x
⋆
i ).
(a2) If ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i) then (2.5) becomes:
[
xi ∈ Si and ui,i(xi) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i)
]
implies xi > x
⋆
i .
If x⋆i 6∈ E(ui,i;Si) then ui,i
(
u◦i,i(x
⋆
i )
)
= ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i), u
◦
i,i(x
⋆
i ) ∈ Si and
u◦i,i(x
⋆
i ) 6∈↑(x
⋆
i ) and therefore (2.5) does not hold.
If x⋆i ∈ E(ui,i;Si) and (2.5) does not hold then there exists xi ∈ Si such that
xi 6∈↑ (x
⋆
i ) and ui,i(xi) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i).
We cannot have ui,i(xi) > ui,i(x
⋆
i ) since this would imply xi > x
⋆
i ; therefore
ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > ui,i(xi). We have shown that
∃xi ∈ Si such that ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > ui,i(xi) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i). (2.6)
Reciprocally, if (2.6) holds we cannot have xi > x
⋆
i , since ui,i isotone, and
therefore (2.5) does not hold.
A Nash point x⋆ such that ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i) is efficient for player i if and
only if x⋆i ∈ E(ui,i;Si) and, for all xi ∈ Si, either ui,i(xi) > ui,i(x
⋆
i ) or
u˜i(x
⋆
−i) > ui,i(xi). We also have ui(x
⋆) = u˜i(x
⋆
−i).
Now, let us assume that Xi is a topological semilattice and that Si is a
connected subset of Xi. If ui,i is continuous on Si and if ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i)
and u˜i(x
⋆
−i) > ui,i(xi) for at least one xi in Si then there must exists x
′
i ∈ Si
such that ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > ui,i(x
′
i) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i).
If Xi is a topological semilattice and that Si is a connected subset of Xi, a
Nash point x⋆ such that ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i) is efficient for player i if and only
if x⋆i ∈ E(ui,i;Si) and, for all xi ∈ Si, ui,i(xi) > ui,i(x
⋆
i ), that is
x⋆i ∈ argmin(ui,i;Si). Therefore, a Nash point x
⋆ such that x⋆i ∈ argmax(ui,i;Si)
can not be efficient for player i, unless ui,i is constant.
What is the meaning of the inequality ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i)? Assume that all
the strategy spaces Xj are topological spaces and that all the functions ui,j,
j ∈ [n], are continuous. One can find, for all j ∈ [n], a neighbourhood V
[i]
j
of x⋆j in Sj such that, for all x ∈ V
[i] =
∏
j∈[n] V
[i]
j , ui,i(xi) > u˜i(x−i) and
therefore, for all x ∈ V [i],
ui(x) = u˜−i(x−i) (2.7)
that is:
if ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜i(x
⋆
−i) then, in a neighbourhood V
[i] of x⋆, the payoff function
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ui of player i is a function of the strategies of the remaining players and not
of its own strategy.
If x⋆ is such that, for all i ∈ [n], ui,i(x
⋆
i ) > u˜−i(x
⋆
−i) then there exists a
neighbourhood W of x⋆ in
∏
i∈[n] Si (for example the intersection of all the
V [j] above), on which, for all i ∈ [n], the payoff function of player i depends
only on the strategies of the remaining players; more precisely, for all i ∈ [n]
and all x ∈ W ,
ui(x) = u˜−i(x−i). (2.8)
Let us look at an example with two players.
S1 = [0, 2], S2 = [0, 2], u1,1(x1) =
{
2x1 if 0 6 x1 ≤ 1
2 if 1 6 x1
, u1,2(x2) =
x2
2
and, u2,1(x1) =
x1
2
, u2,2(x2) =
{
2x2 if 0 6 x2 ≤ 1
2 if 1 6 x2
.
Take x⋆1 = 1, x
⋆
2 = 1; we then have u1,1(x
⋆
1) = u2,2(x
⋆
2), u1,2(x
⋆
2) = u2,1(x
⋆
1) =
1
2
and therefore


u1(x
⋆
1, x
⋆
2) = u1,2(x
⋆
2) =
1
2
u2(x
⋆
1, x
⋆
2) = u2,1(x
⋆
1) =
1
2
and also u1(3/4, x
⋆
2) = u1(x
⋆
1, x
⋆
2)
with x⋆1 > 3/4 and similarly for u2. In conclusion at the Nash point (x
⋆
1, x
⋆
2) =
(1, 1) the payoff of player 1 depends only on the strategy of player 2 and not
on its own strategy and similarly for player 2. As one can see, (1, 1) is not
an efficient Nash point. But, also, (2, 2) is a Nash point since it is the largest
element of S1×S2. There is an efficient Nash point: (0, 0). It gives the small-
est possible payoff to both players. So, a Nash point that gives the largest
possible payoff to both players is not efficient and the Nash point that gives
the smallest possible payoff to both players is efficient.
The problem of the existence of efficient Nash points for individually - and
therefore globally - quasi-Leontief games will be treated in the next section.
3 Indivually quasi-Leontief games
Let us start by defining some of the concepts that will be needed to state the
theorem from which the existence of Nash points for indivually quasi-Leontief
games will be deduced.
We will assume that Λ = R and that all the strategy spaces Xi are topo-
logical inf-semilattices that is:
Xi is an inf-semilattice endowed with a topology for which the inf operation
∧ : Xi ×Xi → Xi is continuous.
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We recall that a subspace Z of a topological space X is path connected if,
for all pair (z0, z1) ∈ Z × Z, there exists a continuous map α : [0, 1] → Z
such that α(0) = z0 and α(1) = z1.
A subset C of an inf-semilattice X is inf-convex if, for all x0, x1 ∈ X ,
[x0 ∧ x1, x0] ⊂ X .
An easy induction shows that if C is an inf-convex subset of an inf-semilattice
X then, for all finite an non empty subset S ⊂ C, ∪x∈S[∧S, x] ⊂ C.
Also, a subset C of an inf-semilattice X is inf-convex if and only if the
following two conditions hold:
(1) S is a sub-semilattice of X ; that is, for all x and y in S, x ∧ y ∈ S and
(2) for all element (x, y) ∈ C × C such that x 6 y one has [x, y] ⊂ C.
Theorem 3.0.2 Let G =
(
ui, Xi
)
i∈[n]
be an abstract game such that:
(1) the strategy spaces Xi are compact metrizable inf-semilattices with path-
connected intervals;
(2) the payoff functions ui :
∏
j∈[n]Xj → R are continuous and such that,
for all x−i ∈
∏
j 6=iXj and all t ∈ R, the set {zi ∈ Xi : ui[x−i](zi) > t} is
inf-convex;
Then Nash
(
G
)
6= ∅.
Theorem 3.0.2 is a simplified version of Theorem 4.1 of Luo [8].
We know from Lemma 2.3.1 of Part I that for a quasi-Leontief u : X →
R function defined on an inf-semilattice X one always has u(x1 ∧ x2) =
min{u(x1), u(x2)} and this implies that, for all t ∈ R, {x ∈ X : u(x) > t}
is inf-convex. From Theorem 3.0.2 we have the existence of Nash points for
abstract individually quasi-Leontieff games.
Theorem 3.0.3 If G =
(
ui, Xi
)
i∈[n]
be an abstract individually quasi-Leontieff
game such that:
(1) the strategy spaces Xi are compact metrizable inf-semilattices with path-
connected intervals;
(2) the payoff functions ui :
∏
j∈[n]Xj → R are continuous.
Then Nash
(
G
)
6= ∅.
In Rm with the partial order associated to the positive cone Rm+ order in-
tervals are path-connected therefore, an inf-convex subset of Rm is an inf-
semilattice with path-connected intervals.
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Corollary 3.0.4 Let G =
(
ui, Xi
)
i∈[n]
be an abstract individually quasi-
Leontieff game such that:
(1) for all i ∈ [n], the strategy space Xi is a compact inf-convex subsets of
R
mi;
(2) the payoff functions ui :
∏
j∈[n]Xj → R are continuous.
Then Nash
(
G
)
6= ∅.
One can easily see that an arbitrary intersection of inf-convex subsets is
inf-convex and that the union ∪C of a family of inf-convex subsets is inf-
convex if, for all C,C ′ ∈ C there exists C ′′ ∈ C such that C ∪ C ′ ⊂ C ′′;
consequently, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) for all t ∈ R, {x ∈ X : u(x) > t} is inf-convex;
(b) for all t ∈ R, {x ∈ X : u(x) > t} is inf-convex.
Let us write [[x1, x2]] for [x1 ∧ x2, x1] ∪ [x1 ∧ x2, x2]. One can now easily see
that C is inf-convex if and only if, for all x1, x2 ∈ C, [[x1, x2]] ⊂ C and that
condition (a) above is equivalent to
∀x1, x2 ∈ X inf
x∈[[x1,x2]]
u(x) > min{u(x1), u(x2)}. (3.1)
Luo’s Theorem applies to a much larger class than the class of individually
quasi-Leontief functions; it only requires the payoff functions to be “inf-
quasiconvex” in each variable. But Luo’s Theorem, which is derived from
a Browder-Fan fixed point theorem for topological inf-semilattices, does not
say anything about the existence of efficient Nash points. We will show that
efficient Nash points always exists but this requires a Kakutani like fixed
point theorem in topological inf-semilattices which can not be, at least as far
as we know, established from the single assumption that intervalls are path
connected.
3.1 Efficient Nash points for individually quasi-Leontief
games
We assume that the strategy spaces are compact topological inf-semilattices
which are metrizable and that the payoff functions ui :
∏
j∈[n]Xj → R
are continuous and individually quasi-Leontieff. We want to show that
there exists an efficient Nash point x⋆, that is, x⋆ ∈ Nash
(
G
)
and x⋆ ∈∏
i∈[n] E(ui[x
⋆
−i], Xi). In other words, we want to show that the map PG de-
fined by PG(x) =
∏
i∈[n] E(ui[x−i], Xi) has a fixed point in Nash
(
G
)
.
For all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi let
E(x) =
∏
i∈[n]
argmax(ui[x−i], E(ui[x−i], Xi)).
8
Lemma 3.1.1 A point x⋆ ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi is an efficient Nash point if and only
if x⋆ ∈ E(x⋆)
Proof: If x⋆ ∈ E(x⋆) then, for all i ∈ [n] and for all zi ∈ E(ui[x
⋆
−i], Xi),
ui(x
⋆) > ui[x
⋆
−i](zi). If xi is an arbitrary element of Xi then ui[x
⋆
−i]
◦(xi) ∈
E(ui[x
⋆
−i], Xi) and ui[x
⋆
−i](xi) = ui[x
⋆
−i]
(
ui[x
⋆
−i]
◦(xi)
)
. This shows that x⋆ is a
Nash point. From E(x⋆) ⊂ PG(x
⋆), x⋆ is an efficient Nash point.
An efficient Nash points x⋆ belongs to
∏
i∈[n] argmax(ui[x
⋆
−i], Xi) and to∏
i∈[n] E(ui[x−i], Xi) and therefore to E(x
⋆). ✷
The set E(x) does not have to be an inf-convex subset of the product space
since x1 6 z 6 x2 with, for all j ∈ [n] and i ∈ {1, 2}, xi,j ∈ E(ui[x−j ], Xj)
does not imply zj ∈ E(uj[x−j ], Xj) - being between two efficient points does
not imply efficiency - all we have is uj[x−j ]
◦(zj) ∈ E(uj[x−j ], Xj). And this is
the cause of some complications. The structure of E(x) is the subject matter
of the following short sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 3.1.2 For all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi the set E(x) is not empty.
Proof: Since ui[x−i] : Xi → R is continuous andXi is compact argmax(ui[x−i], Xi) 6=
∅; if zi ∈ argmax(ui[x−i], Xi) then ui[x−i]
◦(zi) ∈ argmax(ui[x−i], Xi)∩E(ui[x−i], Xi).
✷
Lemma 3.1.3 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact inf-semilattices
with path-connected intervals. If, for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi and all i ∈ [n],
ui[x−i]
◦ : Xi → Xi is continuous then, for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi, the set E(x) is a
topological inf-semilattice with path connected intervals. Furthermore, E(x)
is compact and it has a smallest and a largest element.
Proof: From Lemma 2.3.2 of Part I, E(ui[x−i], Xi) is a sub-semilattice ofXi; if
Si is a sub-semilattice ofXi then, from ui[x−i](x1∧x2) = min{ui[x−i](x1), ui[x−i](x2)},
argmax(ui[x−i], Si) is also a sub-semilattice of Xi and therefore
argmax(ui[x−i], E(ui[x−i], Xi) is a sub-semilattice of Xi.
Since the topology and the inf-operation on E(x) are those induced from∏
i∈[n]Xi the inf-operation restricted to E(x) is continuous. We have shown
that the product space E(x) is a sub-semilattice of the product
∏
i∈[n]Xi.
Let x0 and x1 be two elements of E(x) such that x0 6 x1. The order interval
in E(x) is {z ∈ E(x) : x0 6 z 6 x1} that is [x0, x1] ∩ E(x) where [x0, x1] is the
order interval in
∏
i∈[n]Xi. We have to show that there exists a continuous
path α : [0, 1] →
∏
i∈[n]Xi such that α(i) = xi for i ∈ {0, 1} and, for all
t ∈ [0, 1], α(t) ∈ [x0, x1] ∩ E(x).
Choose a continuous path γi : [0, 1]→ [x0,i, x1,i] and let αi(t) = ui[x−i]
◦(γi(t));
we have αi(t) ∈ E(ui[x−i], Xi).
Since x0,i and x1,i are both in argmax(ui[x−i], Xi) with x0,i,6 x1,i and since
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ui[x−i] is isotone we have [x0,i, x1,i] ⊂ argmax(ui[x−i], Xi) and consequently
γi(t) ∈ argmax(ui[x−i], Xi). From ui[x−i](γi(t)) = ui[x−i]
(
ui[x−i]
◦(γi(t))
)
we
have αi(t) ∈ argmax(ui[x−i], Xi).
In conclusion, αi(t) ∈ argmax(ui[x−i], E(ui[x−i], Xi)).
Since ui[x−i]
◦ is continuous and Xi is compact the set of fixed points of
ui[x−i]
◦, that is E(ui[x−i], Xi), is compact; from the continuity of ui[x−i]
follows the compactness of argmax(ui[x−i], E(ui[x−i], Xi)). This shows that
E(x) is compact.
We have already seen that a compact inf-semilattice has a smallest element,
let m(x) be the smallest element of E(x). But argmax(ui[x−i], E(ui[x−i], Xi))
is totally ordered since it is a subset of the totally ordered set E(ui[x−i], Xi);
by compactness it has a largest element M i(x); M(x) is the largest element
of E(x). ✷
Lemma 3.1.4 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact metizable inf-
semilattices. If PG is upper semicontinuous then E is upper semicontinuous.
Proof: By compactness it is sufficient to show that the graph of E is a
closed subset of
∏
i∈[n]Xi ×
∏
i∈[n]Xi. We have (x, y) ∈ E if and only if,
for all i ∈ [n], yi ∈ E(ui[x−i], Xi) ∩ argmax(ui[x−i], Xi). Let (xm, ym)m∈N
be a sequence of elements of the graph of E that converges to a point (x¯, y¯).
From ym,i ∈ argmax(ui[xm,−i], Xi) and the continuity of ui we have y¯i ∈
argmax(ui[x¯−i], Xi).
The sequence (xm, ym)m∈N also belongs to the graph of PG , which is upper
semicontinuous; therefore y¯i ∈ E(ui[x¯−i], Xi). ✷
Lemma 3.1.5 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact metizable
inf-semilattices, and that:
(1) for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi and all i ∈ [n], ui[x−i]
◦ is continuous;
(2) for all i ∈ [n] and for all convergent sequence (xm)m∈N of points of the
product space
∏
i∈[n]Xi with limit x¯, the sequence of functions (ui[xm,−i]
◦)m∈N
converges pointwise to ui[x¯−i]
◦.
Then PG is upper semicontinuous.
Proof: Assume that the sequence (xm, ym)m∈N converges to (x¯, y¯) and that
ym ∈ PG(xm). We have to see that, for all i ∈ [n], y¯i = ui[x¯−i]
◦(y¯i).
Let di be a metric for Xi. From ym,i = u[xm,−i]
◦(ym,i) we can write

di
(
y¯i, ui[x¯−i]
◦(y¯i)
)
6 di
(
y¯i, ym,i
)
+ di
(
u[xm,−i]
◦(ym,i), u[xm,−i]
◦(y¯i)
)
+
+ di
(
u[xm,−i]
◦(y¯i), u[x¯−i]
◦(y¯i)
)
.
Since Xi is compact and u[xm,−i]
◦ is continuous we can, for ε > 0 choose
δm(ε) > 0 such that, if di(zi, wi) < δm(ε) then di
(
u[xm,−i]
◦(zi), u[xm,−i]
◦(wi)
)
<
ε/3.
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We can choose m = m(ε) such that di
(
y¯i, ym(ε),i
)
< ε/3 and
di
(
u[x
m(ε),−i]
◦(y¯i), u[x¯−i]
◦(y¯i)
)
< ε/3.
We have shown that di
(
y¯i, ui[x¯−i]
◦(y¯i)
)
6 ε. ✷
Lemma 3.1.6 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact inf-semilattices
with path-connected intervals. If, for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi and all i ∈ [n],
ui[x−i]
◦ : Xi → Xi is continuous then, for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi, the set E(x) is
homotopically trivial.
Proof: For all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi, E(x) is a compact inf-semilattice; we have seen
that it has a smallest element and that it is path-connected. By a theorem
of D.R. Brown, Theorem B in [5], E(x) is homotopically trivial. ✷
A topological inf-semilattice is a Lawson semilattice if each point has a
neighbourhood base consisting of inf-semilattices. For example, a sub-inf-
semilattice of Rn is a Lawson semilattice. A product of Lawson semilattices
equipped with the product topology is a Lawson semilattice.
Theorem 3.1.7 Let G =
(
Xi, ui
)
i∈[n]
be a quasi-Leontief game such that:
(1) all the strategy spaces are metrizable compact and locally connected path
connected Lawson semilattices;
(2) all the payoff functions ui :
∏
i∈[n]Xi → R are continuous;
(3) for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi and all i ∈ [n], ui[x−i]
◦ : Xi → Xi is continuous.
Then, G has an efficient Nash point.
Proof: From the preceeding lemmas, E is an upper semicontinuous map
with non empty homotopically trivial values from
∏
i∈[n]Xi to itself.
Each Xi has path connected intervals therefore, given two arbitrary points x1
and x2 of Xi there is a continuous path from x1 to x1 ∧ x2 and a continuous
path from x1 ∧ x2 to x2; Xi is path connected, and a fortiori connected.
By a theorem of M. McWaters, [9], condition (1) implies that each Xi is an
absolute retract;
∏
i∈[n]Xi is therefore an absolute retract.
Homotopically trivial sets being acyclic, E is an upper semicontinous map
with non empty acyclic values from the compact absolute retract
∏
i∈[n]Xi to
itself. By the Eilenberg-Montgomery Theorem, [6] Page 543 Corollary (7.5),
there exists x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi such that x ∈ E(x). ✷
Corollary 3.1.8 Let G =
(
Xi, ui
)
i∈[n]
be a quasi-Leontief game such that:
(1) Xi is a compact inf-convex subset of R
ni;
(2) all the payoff functions ui :
∏
i∈[n]Xi → R are continuous;
(3) for all x ∈
∏
i∈[n]Xi and all i ∈ [n], ui[x−i]
◦ : Xi → Xi is continuous.
Then, G has an efficient Nash point.
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Proof: In Rn intervals are path connected; an inf-convex subset of Rn
is therefore a subsemilattice with path connected intervals. Let x be an
arbitrary point of Xi and let U be a neighbourhood of x in Xi. Choose a
neighbourhood V of x in Rni such that U = Xi ∩V and a neighbourhood W
of x in Rni such that W ⊂ V and W is inf-convex; W could for example be a
box around x. Since the intersection of two inf-convex sets is inf-convex and
an inf-convex set is path connected we have that W ∩Xi is a neighbourhood
of x in Xi that is a connected inf-semilattice contained in U ; this shows that
Xi is a locally connected Lawson semilattice. ✷
A final remark: The algebraic and the topological assumptions used through-
out this paper are not as different as one could believe. The compactness
assumption is natural and at the same time seems to be somewhat indeter-
minate but, as a matter of fact, there is at most one topology on a given
semillatice for which it is a compact topological semilattice and continuity is
defined entirely in terms of order convergence. For a lattice, that topology is
explicitely determined by the algebraic structure of the lattice. For this, and
more and topological lattices and semilattices see Theorem 15 and Corollary
16 in [7].
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